It is the level of forethought and preparedness and level-headedness --admittedly, amongst other things --revealed by the US's administrator-training program in 1943 that helped make the nation-building and democratization experiments in Japan and Germany so successful. And it is, I fear, the level of unpreparedness and muddle-headedness that left that division without orders in Baghdad that puts at great risk our nation-building and democratization experiments in Iraq and Afghanistan. But our ineptness with regard to these practical, local and immediate issues is much less significant than our conceptual 1 Michael Doyle mentions these two episodes in his contribution to Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs, Multilateral Strategies to Promote Democracy: Edited Transcript of High-Level Panel (New York: Carnegie Council, 2003), p. 39. 2 unpreparedness, a shortage of both analysis and imagination about the possibility of different, equally legitimate shapes democratic constitutionalism might take in these places.
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That is, I think that our challenge in promoting post-conflict democracy in Iraq and Afghanistan is two-fold: first, we may both know too little and have made too many mistaken assumptions about the workings of politics, economics, culture and religion in these places; second, and more important, we may have too undifferentiated and unsophisticated a conception of what democracy and democratic constitutionalism are and can be under different cultural circumstances. What this means is that the democratization projects in Afghanistan and Iraq would not suddenly become feasible if only we could get better information about these places; there would still remain the challenge of accepting that democracy and democratic constitutionalism as we have come to know them might simply be bad fits for these places.
Bearing this dual difficulty in mind, my aim in today's talk is to think about the odds that our occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan will lead to the sort of happy outcome that the post-war occupations of Japan and Germany did, and also about what might be done to improve those odds. I am going to try to avoid the question of whether we should be in Iraq and Afghanistan at all, because it is rather too late for that. Whatever one's view of the need to intervene militarily in either Afghanistan or Iraq, we can all agree that a democratic nation that chooses to intervene to overthrow anti-democratic regimes surely carries the burden of leaving some sort of stable and (ideally) democratic constitutionalist state behind it. The minimum required is to provide for the rule of law and some sort of consent-based government. But I do not believe the Bush administration took the challenges of doing this sufficiently seriously, and I think that it made assumptions about these regions and countries that were badly flawed.
The exercise for this lecture is to put ourselves in the position of planners for post-war Afghanistan and Iraq, and to ask what sound, realistic, assumptions would have been, and what, on that basis, we should have aspired to accomplish. I think that if we can develop a better-informed and more nuanced understanding of the problem of establishing constitutional democracy in places that have no history of such institutions, we will be in a better position to pick up the pieces of a failing policy and consider what realistic options there are for political and legal re-engineering of the existing interim constitutional settlements in Afghanistan and Iraq.
I therefore want to focus on three related issues in this talk. First, I want to talk about the issue of democratic constitutionalism itself --about the different meanings it has and could have in different places. I'm going to expand on this point substantially in the first part of this talk, but let me just quickly lay out my basic claim here: we need to be very careful about mistaking the trappings of democratic constitutionalism for its substance. Constitutional documents and elections alone do not make true democratic constitutionalism. My fear is that too many of our current war planners are improvising in their post-war (if that is the correct term) planning, and mistaking the democratic superstructure for the democratic base.
My second point develops from the first. I want to examine the similarities and differences (mostly glaring differences, it seems to me) between the cultural and military contexts in which democratization took place in post-war Japan and Germany, on the one hand, and in which it is hoped to take place in Iraq and Afghanistan. I believe --and I know I am not the first to make this point --that some of us too easily assume that what we did in the first two democratic reconstructions we can do in the second two, and in the same sorts of ways. I think that this view is dangerously incorrect. What I want to argue is that the attempts to democratize Afghanistan and Iraq are sui generis, and while we would be silly not to learn from the history of successful democratization endeavors, I
think that the main lesson may be that we simply may not be able to learn from those earlier episodes what we should do at the present time.
The link between my first and second points is fairly simple. I think a good case can be made that part of the reason that Japan and Germany were successfully democratized is that both exhibited, in one form or another, the stirrings of a base for democratic constitutionalism, and I am not convinced that a similar base exists in either Iraq or Afghanistan. My third point will expand on the second, and consider the challenges our nation-builders face in creating constitutional democracy in specifically Islamic contexts.
The Nature of Democratic Constitutionalism
I want to start on ground with which I can claim some familiarity. While I confess that I am not nearly as well-versed in the history and politics of the Middle East and Central Asia as I would like to be, I have, however, worked for many years on the theory . . . broad agreement . . . on the essence of constitutionalism, fidelity to the principle that the exercise of state power must seek to advance the ends of society, that attainment has not been an easy matter. The political history of many societies is replete with struggles for an optimal balance between the few on whom constitutions confer power and the vast majority for whose benefit it is supposed to be exercised. What is clear is that in no society has that balance been achieved through the promulgation of a constitution, per se. [Democratic constitutionalism is] a commitment to limitations on ordinary political power; it revolves around a political process, one that overlaps with democracy in seeking to balance state power and individual and collective rights; it draws on particular cultural and historical contexts from which it emanates; and it resides in public consciousness.
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Later work on the development of constitutionalism --this time in postCommunist East Central Europe --reinforced my conviction that constitutionalism is a continuing political and social process, issuing out of contestation and admitting few absolutes. This is how I put the matter then:
[S]horn of universals, what is constitutionalism? To my mind, if there is an essence of constitutionalism (and I believe there is) it is not to be found in the structure of the constitutional arrangements and institutions that are established in a particular country. Rather, it is to be found in the practice of constitutionalism, in a form of politics that is based on the notion of respect for the rule of law, in which the government, however it is configured, reflects the basic values and aspirations of the community. That is to say that generic constitutionalism consists in a process within a society by which the community commits itself to the rule of law, specifies its basic values, and agrees to abide by a legal/institutional structure which guarantees that formal social institutions will respect the agreed-upon values. . . . . constitutions are made, not found. . . . [T] hey are human creations, products of convention, choice, the specific history of a particular people, and (almost always) a political struggle in which some win and others lose. . . . one might even want to argue that our constitution is more something we do than something we make: we (re)shape it all the time through our collective activity. Our constitution is (what is relatively stable in) our activity; a stranger learns its principles by watching our conduct. 9 This is a highly realistic account that posits a tight fit between constitutional behavior and constitutionalism, and it seems compelling to me as an account of the U.S. constitutional experience, as well as a basis for thinking about comparative constitutionalism. Each society must, I think, develop its own culture of constitutionalism. Such national cultures will indeed bear certain generic similarities to one another, but they will be living cultures, constantly evolving in dialectical tension with the larger cultures of which they are a part. Almost always successful constitutionalism represents the conclusion of long domestic struggle for democracy and the rule of law. It does not come easily.
I imagine that you can see by now where this argument is going. If constitutionalism is the difficult, contextual, contested process I have been arguing it is, then we are making a very serious mistake if we think constitutionalism can be the gift of A new Iraqi constitution … must rest on the concept of the separation of powers among the legislative, the judiciary, and the executive, and it must set forth the relations of these three powers in practical ways. To deter abuse, the guardian of the Constitution must not be the Executive or Legislative branch of the state. The only Guardian of the Constitution is the Supreme Court of Iraq, consisting of a Chief Justice and other judges. This court stands at the apex of a single judicial system for the whole country (inclusive of all its regions, provinces and/or governorates). This Supreme Court is the final court of appeal in the land on all constitutional questions. Dobbins is more concerned with the sorts of practical issues I'll be getting to in the next part of this talk, but the spirit of his caution applies just as much to the more abstract issues of democratic constitutionalism I have been discussing. He notes that there is a depressing tendency for the US to go wrong in the same ways over and over again in its attempts to foster democracy around the world:
[S]uccessive administrations have treated each new [nation-building] mission as if it were the first and, more importantly, as if it were the last. Each time we have sent out new people to face old problems, and seen them make old mistakes. Each time we have dissipated accumulated expertise after an operation has been concluded, failing to study the lessons and integrate the results in our doctrine., training and future planning, or to retrain and make use of the experienced personnel in ways that ensure their availability for the next mission when it arrives.
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My conclusion, then, and this will not shock anyone, I suspect, is that even though there are at least some indications that we are thinking about the issue of encouraging democratic constitutionalism in the right way, there is still room for grave concern. I am inclined to think that the glass is half-empty, but we shall see.
Germany and Japan vs. Afghanistan and Iraq
I want to turn now to the second issue I mentioned --whether the nation-building and democratization projects in Germany and Japan can and should serve as models for Let me say just a few words first about the post-war characteristics and situations of Japan and Germany. The economic and political reconstructions of these countries took place after a war fought by a genuine international coalition. There really was an Axis of Evil then, and the victory of the Allies was generally acknowledged to be the victory of the good over the bad, of democracy over dictatorship. There was general approval of the Franklin Delano Roosevelt's conception of "Four Freedoms" as universal truths that should guide the reconstruction of the world. Japan and Germany were both thoroughly beaten militarily, their surrenders were unconditional, and their citizens did not contest the legitimacy of their occupations. Not a single instance of violence against occupying forces in Japan, for instance, was recorded. Japan and Germany were highly homogeneous, "natural" nations --or at least as natural as nations come. Weimar
Germany had developed a quite sophisticated constitutional democratic political system after World War I, and even Japan, before the takeover of the militarists, contained democratic and civil society institutions consistent with the rather long traditions of Meiji constitutionalism. And, as I have already noted, the US had been making preparations to administer post-conflict Japan and Germany for several years before the event.
Are committed to reconstruction in Germany and Japan. Does this suggest that the obstacles it seems Iraq and Afghanistan will face on the road to democratization may be overcome if the United States and the international community put enough effort into supporting the democratization process?
The first problem here is that it looks like the bulk of any effort that goes into supporting the democratization effort will have to come from the United States, not only because the missions in Afghanistan and Iraq were very largely carried out by the US (of some 160 000 troops in Iraq, almost 140 000 are American), but because the US is rather jealously guarding its prerogative to decide unilaterally how matters in these countries should be managed. We will see soon enough how genuine our proffer of authority to the United Nations is -and whether the U.N. will accept it. There is less support and input from the international community into the democratization process than there needs to be.
This might not pose too serious a problem if the US were itself prepared to shoulder the extremely significant burdens that democratization processes entail. But it is not clear that we are. There are many ways to suggest that this is the case, but one is especially instructive. At the end of World War II, the number of US soldiers stationed in Germany stood at 100 for every thousand Germans, and it took two years before that number fell to about ten. In Japan that figure was about five soldiers for every thousand Japanese. And this was, remember, in countries which showed no inclination whatsoever to menace the occupation forces. By contrast, in Iraq and Afghanistan, where the population is anything but compliant, there are fewer than six soldiers for every thousand
Iraqis, and about two-tenths of a soldier for every thousand Afghans. If Japan and
Germany are indeed to serve as models for the occupation and democratization of Iraq and Afghanistan, we should, it seems to be, be thinking more like General Eric Shinseki and less like Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld about the numbers of troops needed in these countries. But even then our current nation-building efforts face a new and difficult challenge, since Afghanistan and Iraq are Islamic nations.
What difference does it make that Afghanistan and Iraq are Islamic nations?
How does The way to make that happen is to increase basic individual rights, so people can make controversial political arguments and form new political associations. One important effect of increasing individual rights in this way is that multiple points of view will have the chance to emerge, so that Islamist political parties are not the only organized parties when elections are held. (pp. 83-84) But is this likely to be the case, or is Feldman taking for granted the universality of political behavior (reflecting the Western Aristotelian assumption of zoon politikon, the idea that man is a political animal), and simply assuming that individual rights-based western constitutionalism is inevitable?
His liberal assumptions makes Feldman somewhat optimistic about the prospects for democracy in Afghanistan, mainly because he believes that the pressure on the United
States to produce democracy after conquest will be so strong -"because the United
States eliminated the existing government, it is perceived as having a duty to make sure that what replaces the old government is something better." He notes that the constitutional assembly, the loya jirga, held under our auspices in June, 2002 "began the democratic process in Afghanistan:
Members were elected locally and spoke freely while Afghans listened on the radio. This astonishingly democratic event was not always edifying, with warlord jockeying for seats up front, participating in background deals, and condoning the intimidation of some of the more outspoken delegates, but it certainly counted as nascent democracy, and it followed directly from U.S. intervention. (pp.85-6) But this strikes me as naïve and uncritical. "Nascent" suggests that something natural is growing, and that it will follow a predetermined course, more or less. But the significant fact is that none of this would be happening if it were not for U.S. "intervention." In a democracy, we need a new epistemological grounding today to calmly and reasonably engage with modern ideas; we need to embrace these new democratic ideas rather than reject them as foreign to Islam. We can appropriate them-they are not the exclusive property of the West-and make them our own. I'm not saying that we should uncritically accept Western ideas, either; all ideas must be carefully examined in light of our tradition.
But he recognizes that the job will not be easy:
Though there are democratic values in Islam and though there is no conflict between democracy and Islam on a procedural level, the theoretical basis of democracy is problematic. Values of democracy and its criteria are extrareligious values which Ash'arite theologians reject, which makes it very difficult to explore this topic. Due to its secular value system, democracy cannot be reconciled with Islam without first unearthing sources for democratic values within Islam itself. Otherwise, the task is futile, as without this grounding, democracy will never be acceptable to a religious mind.
There is in fact a modern (twentieth century) Islamic idea that the Qur'anic ideal of shura (consultation) is somehow to be identified with democratic process. The practice has been more complicated, however, since Islamist parties who participate in free elections and "talk democratic talk" are often suspected of secret commitment to the idea of "one man, one vote, one time." This is an extremely complex subject and I am hardly a specialist in Islamic thought, but I suspect that the high level of generality of Given its nature and traditions, then, there is nothing in Islam that should give us cause for concern if our interest is in the flourishing of a democratic civil society marked by diversity. This is not to say that Islamic political movements have not, or never will, pose any danger. For any political movement can be dangerous. But it is to say that Islam as a creed is not the problem, and may even hold within it some of the resources that supply a solution. Most important among these resources is the tradition of toleration; but not less significant may be the fact that, in the end, it is also distrustful of nationalism." Afghanistan's new Constitution is mostly a model of moderation, guaranteeing many rights and freedoms for men and women. But it has a very dangerous loophole: it states that no law can be contrary to the "beliefs and provisions" of Islam. (This formulation replaced the more liberal phrase, "principles of Islam," in last minute politicking at the loya jirga, Afghanistan's constitutional convention.) "Provisions" can be interpreted by extremists to allow for the imposition of Sharia, or strict Islamic law. Another section of the Constitution gives the Supreme Court [in Afghanistan] the power to determine whether laws and treaties made by the government are in accordance with the Constitution. Together, these two articles give the Supreme Court the power to reject virtually any law or treaty as un-Islamic. 20 In Iraq, as in Afghanistan, everything will depend upon the operational significance given to the constitutional embededness of the role of religion and religious norms.
I remarked at the beginning of this lecture that the exercise at hand is to put ourselves in the role of planners for constitutional democracy in America's latest attempt at nation-building. Your assignment now is to think through the difficulties and 
